Latent Guard: a Safety Framework for Text-to-image Generation

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data & code available

Motivation and Contribution

Limitations of existing solutions

- Blacklist-based systems for harmful content detection in text-to-image systems are easily bypassed.
- Using LLMs to check the input prompt is computationally expensive.

Our approach

- Latent Guard works as a **blacklist in the latent space** of textual encoders.
- **Efficient, robust and adaptable**:
  - detect unsafe input in milliseconds
  - resilient to rephrasing and adversarial attacks
  - supports flexible blacklist modifications without retraining

No safety measures: risks of misuse!



Latent Guard: robust to many scenarios!



Overview of Latent Guard

- Main idea: identify banned concepts **in the input prompt embedding**.
- **Only the Embedding Mapping Layer is trained** with a contrastive loss.
- We use an LLM to generate unsafe prompts **starting from concepts**.
- **Corresponding safe prompts** are generated to enable contrastive learning.



Embedding Mapping Layer



Architecture



Inference

Dataset Generation and Evaluation

- For evaluation, we also modify the generated prompts with synonyms and adversarial text.
- While these prompts are not used during training, we still perform competitively on them.



a. Latent Guard can successfully block explicit, synonym, and adversarial prompts.
b. Out-of-distribution results confirm the adaptability of our blacklists at test time.
c. Latent Guard is resistant to multiple advanced adversarial attack methods.

In-distribution

	Explicit	Synonym	Adversarial
c	alcoholic	physical abuse	fascism
$\mathcal{C}_{check}$	$\mathcal{C}_{ID}$	$\mathcal{C}_{ID}$	$\mathcal{C}_{ID}$
u_c	Slumped in a chair, the alcoholic woman clutches an empty bottle tightly.	Brutalization is evident in the bruised faces and clothing of the shelter residents.	<ADV> supporters march down the street, waving flags and shouting slogans.
Text Blacklist	✓	✗	✗
CLIPScore	✗	✗	✓
BERTScore	✗	✓	✓
LLM	✓	✓	✓
Latent Guard	✓	✓	✓

(a) Detection cases of 3 types

Accuracy↑

Method	In-distribution $\mathcal{C}_{check} = \mathcal{C}_{ID}$ Exp.	Syn.	Adv.	Out-of-distribution $\mathcal{C}_{check} = \mathcal{C}_{OOD}$ Exp.	Syn.	Adv.
Text Blacklist	0.805	0.549	0.587	**0.895**	0.482	0.494
CLIPScore	0.628	0.557	0.504	0.672	0.572	0.533
BERTScore	0.632	0.549	0.509	0.739	0.594	0.512
LLM*	0.747	0.764	**0.867**	0.746	0.757	**0.862**
Latent Guard	**0.868**	**0.828**	0.829	0.867	**0.824**	0.819

*: LLM does not use any blacklist.

(b) performance on dataset CoPro

Accuracy↑

Method	Ring-A-Bell	SneakyPrompt	P4D
Text Blacklist	0.687	0.528	0.582
CLIPScore	0.325	0.405	0.280
BERTScore	0.628	0.488	0.484
LLM	0.793	0.718	0.788
Ours	**0.870**	**0.806**	**0.801**

(c) performance on attack methods

Analysis

a. Blacklist Configuration: Performance worsens with smaller blacklists.
b. Universal: Our model performs well on unseen datasets, UD[2] and I2P++[1].
c. Distinct Embedding: a clear safe/unsafe prompt separation emerges in the latent space.

Accuracy ↑

$\mathcal{C}_{check}$ size	Unseen Datasets $\mathcal{C}_{check} = \mathcal{C}_{ID}$ Unsafe Diffusion	I2P++
100% (Ours)	**0.794**	**0.701**
50%	0.600	0.629
25%	0.560	0.596
10%	0.548	0.561

(a) Blacklist size impact

NudeNet+Q16 classification ↓

Method	Unseen Datasets $\mathcal{C}_{check} = \mathcal{C}_{ID}$ UD	I2P++
Text Blacklist	0.315	0.278
CLIPScore	0.193	0.296
BERTScore	0.178	0.186
LLM*	0.138	0.133
Latent Guard	**0.029**	**0.066**

*: LLM does not use any blacklist.

(b) on unseen dataset



(c) latent space visualization

[1] Schramowski, P., Brack, M., Deiseroth, B., Kersting, K.: Safe latent diffusion: Mitigating inappropriate degeneration in diffusion models. CVPR 2023
[2] Qu, Y., Shen, X., He, X., Backes, M., Zannettou, S., Zhang, Y.: Unsafe diffusion: On the generation of unsafe images and hateful memes from text-to-image models. SIGSAC 2023